In 1951 as a kid I saw a simple black-and-white movie called “The Steel Helmet.” It was about a U.S. Army platoon trapped in the cold, winter weather of the Korean War, fighting to stay alive under incessant Chinese attacks. This memory came back to me when I read David Halberstam’s last book, “The Coldest Winter,” subtitled “America and the Korea War.”

Halberstam does not focus on the entire war, which lasted from 1950-1953. Instead he emphasizes a few, select battles to illustrate how badly American troops were led by General Douglas MacArthur and his cronies. Halberstam also takes time between battles to explain how the final stalemate, which still exists, was a product of miscalculations everywhere by Mao Tse-tsung, Harry Truman, MacArthur, Kim Il Sung and Stalin.

The Korean War was the war between wars. It was fought by ill-trained Americans led by sergeants and officers still in the demobilized Army after World War II. It was also the first of America’s wars on the mainland of Asia, and the lessons learned in this war were immediately forgotten by the politicians and generals of Vietnam.

Kim Il Sung, North Korean leader, ordered his Army, the In Min Gun, to attack American and South Korean forces on June 25, 1950. They pushed forward across what is now South Korea, driving the unprepared and, it turned out, poorly trained and poorly led Republic of South Korean (ROK) troops south. American forces were not much better off.

Their commander was General Douglas MacArthur, who was in Japan overseeing post-war Japan. MacArthur, 70 years old at the time, was, perhaps, the most honored general in the U.S. Army, but, frankly, he was over the hill.

Surrounded by flunkies who protected him from anything negative, MacArthur thought he knew how orientals thought. He was wrong. MacArthur had escaped from the Philippines after he had ignored warnings of a possible Japanese surprise attack. He should have been court-martialed. MacArthur, however, had an exalted opinion of himself, reinforced by sycophants on his staff.

MacArthur was also pro-Chiang Kai-chek, the corrupt and losing Generalissimo of the Chinese Civil War. In that MacArthur was not alone, as the China Lobby, formed of influential Congressmen and American businessmen, like Henry Luce, publisher of Time and Life magazines, supported Chiang unswervingly.

Halberstam spends considerable time in “The Coldest Winter” explaining the political difficulties that President Truman faced against the China Lobby, the Republican upsurge based upon a policy of anti-communism (think Senator McCarthy), and MacArthur’s intransigence. The last Truman could do something about.

In between the North Korean attack and MacArthur’s final apotheosis, 54,246 American soldiers died in Korea, almost as many as in Vietnam. The troops died in small skirmishes as shown in the movie and in large set pieces like the defense of the Pusan perimeter.

The In Min Gun had driven the U.S. and ROK forces behind the Naktong River in southeast Korea, centered around the port of Pusan. Here, led by U.S. General Walton (Johnnie) Walker, the In Min Gun were stopped, and then MacArthur in his last shining moment changed the war.

The landing at Inchon, far behind the North Korean lines, was a brilliant maneuver, and MacArthur should receive full credit for its audacity and success. However, he then threw away the surprise victory by concentrating on securing Seoul, the capital, instead of cutting off and trapping the North Korean Army, fleeing from its Pusan positions.

MacArthur compounded this mistake by pursuing the In Min Gun all the way to the Yalu River, the border between Korea and China. MacArthur refused to believe that the Chinese would enter the war, even though intelligence services not under his control knew of at least three Chinese armies gathered on the north bank of the Yalu. What no American really knew is that the Chinese had already crossed the Yalu and were waiting for American troops to be fully extended in pursuit of the In Min Gun.

The rest, as they say, is history. The Chinese attacked, American troops retreated, winter came, and the coldest winter in American military history, even worse that the Battle of the Bulge, ensued.

Halberstam does not tell the full story of this most difficult retreat. He details how the American forces had to adjust to Chinese tactics — night attacks with thousands, no heavy artillery but many mortars, and a penchant for ambush. He describes a few battles intently, such as Chipyongni and the withdrawal from Chosin Reservoir, “a masterpiece of leadership on the part of [the American] officers and of simple, relentless, abiding courage on the part of the ordinary fighting men.”

All that is left in the book, then, is the deserved sacking of MacArthur by Truman. The telling point in this monumental event is that no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported MacArthur. He had finally antagonized all but his claque. It is unfortunate that he is now held to be the very “model of a modern major general,” when his hubris cost so many lives.

Ralph Mohr taught English and Latin at Marshfield High School for 31 years. He welcomes comments and suggestions at rmohr1565@charter.net.